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Sophia Z.  Lee 
 
A Revolution at War with Itself? Preserving 
Employment Preferences from Weber to Ricci 
abstract.  Two aspects of the constitutional transformation Bruce Ackerman describes in 
The Civil Rights Revolution were on a collision course, one whose trajectory has implications for 
Ackerman’s account and for his broader theory of constitutional change. Ackerman makes a 
compelling case that what he terms “reverse state action” (the targeting of private actors) and 
“government by numbers” (the use of statistics to identify and remedy violations of civil rights 
laws) defined the civil rights revolution. Together they “requir[ed] private actors, as well as state 
officials, to . . . realize the principles of constitutional equality” and allowed the federal 
government to “actually achieve egalitarian advances in the real world.” Within the frame of 
Ackerman’s study, these features of the civil rights revolution worked in tandem, perhaps even 
synergistically, helping to generate the period’s remarkable changes in voting, employment, and 
education. But as this essay shows, at least in the case of employment discrimination, reverse 
state action quickly became a threat to government by numbers. In the 1970s, no sooner did 
numerical measures take hold in preventing, settling, and remedying employment 
discrimination than courts faced claims that these measures violated the very laws pursuant to 
which they had been adopted. Exactly when and where state action adhered ultimately helped 
decide the viability of the numerical approach in the new employment discrimination regime. 
The eventual tensions between the “government by numbers” and “reverse state action” strands 
of Ackerman’s account raise questions about the content and viability of the civil rights 
revolution he documents. They also underscore the importance of refining his theory’s account 
of what he terms consolidation, synthesis, and judicial betrayal.   
 
author. Assistant Professor of Law and History, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to 
thank Maria da Silva for outstanding research assistance; Christine Jolls and Reva Siegel for 
helpful comments; and the Journal’s editors for their help polishing the piece. I am deeply 
indebted to Bruce Ackerman for inviting me to participate in this symposium and for being such 
an inspirational teacher and scholar. 
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introduction 
In January 1973, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
reached a pathbreaking settlement with American Telephone & Telegraph 
(AT&T). The agency, created to implement the employment discrimination 
title (Title VII) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,1 had a rough start, plagued by 
uneven leadership, insufficient staff, and underfunding that resulted in 
enormous backlogs.2 The AT&T settlement marked a turn in its fortunes. The 
case was sui generis. As the district court asked to approve the agreement noted, 
“there was no significant pending litigation in the federal courts when this 
consent decree was signed or . . . when the extensive negotiations that led to 
the decree took place.”3 The EEOC’s Chairman, William H. Brown III, called it 
“the most significant legal settlement in the civil rights employment history.”4 
The agency’s “comparatively low profile . . . was strikingly altered” by the 
agreement.5 Nowhere was this more the case than within the business 
community: “There is a lot of teeth-chattering going on around here,” a vice-
president of a large retail chain observed; equal employment consulting firms 
multiplied as their market of worried employers grew.6 
 
1.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2006). 
2.  3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 180-81 (2014) 
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS]; HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: 
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972, at 203-04, 234-37 (1990); 
JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 120-25 (1996). 
3.  EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1030 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
4.  Jo Anne Levine, Landmark Bias Case Settlement, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1973, at G1, G7. 
5.  Douglas W. Cray, Job Discrimination Charges Grow: Federal Agency’s Efforts Broaden, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1973, at F14. 
6.  Harvey D. Shapiro, Women on the Line, Men at the Switchboard: Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comes to the Bell System, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 20, 1973, at 26, 90. The AT&T 
settlement resolved a massive action the EEOC initiated against AT&T under Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) rules requiring the company to ensure equal 
employment. It also addressed pending charges against the company by the Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) and other offices within the Labor Department. For 
general accounts of the settlement, see VENUS GREEN, RACE ON THE LINE: GENDER, LABOR, 
AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE BELL SYSTEM, 1880–1980 (2001); LOIS KATHRYN HERR, WOMEN, 
POWER, AND AT&T: WINNING RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE (2003); and MARJORIE A. 
STOCKFORD, THE BELLWOMEN: THE STORY OF THE LANDMARK AT&T SEX DISCRIMINATION 
CASE (2004). For accounts of the FCC’s adoption of equal employment rules and why they 
put pressure on AT&T to settle, see SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM 
THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at ch. 8) (on file with 
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The AT&T case plays a small but pivotal role in Bruce Ackerman’s 
compelling new book, The Civil Rights Revolution.7 This is the third volume in 
his series contending that Americans have developed an alternate system of 
“higher-lawmaking” in response to the near impossibility of formally 
amending the Constitution via Article V. According to Ackerman, all three 
branches periodically interact with each other and a mobilized electorate in a 
sustained way over time to formulate new extra-textual constitutional 
commitments.8 His latest installment claims that the “Second Reconstruction” 
was an instance of this extra-Article V amendment process and elaborates the 
substance of the resulting commitments.9 One of Ackerman’s key claims is that 
rather than adopt a universal, abstract notion of equality, Americans employed 
what he calls a “sphere-by-sphere” approach in which the legitimate means for 
achieving equality were fitted to different structures of inequality. So, for 
instance, although there was a general commitment to achieving “real-world 
egalitarian gains,”10 Ackerman explains that the constitutionally acceptable 
means for doing so varied for voting rights as opposed to public 
accommodations.11 
For Ackerman, the AT&T case typified one foundational feature of the 
constitutional revolution regarding employment discrimination and helped 
forge another. First, by targeting private employers such as AT&T, Ackerman 
argues that Title VII fundamentally altered “the state action doctrine of the 
nineteenth century,” which he notes typically “insulate[d] private actors from 
[the Constitution’s] egalitarian principles but impose[d] them rigorously on 
all state actors.”12 Second, the AT&T case helped refine how the employment 
discrimination dimension of this constitutional revolution would employ what 
Ackerman refers to as “government by numbers”: the use of statistics to 
identify and remedy civil rights violations.13 In a 20,000-page report replete 
 
author) [hereinafter LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION]; and Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, 
and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 
VA. L. REV. 799 (2010) [hereinafter Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking]. 
7.  ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2.  
8.  See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). 
9.  ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2; see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF 
JIM CROW 9 (1955) (coining the phrase “Second Reconstruction”). 
10.  ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 14. 
11.  Id. at 107-53. 
12.  Id. at 12-13. 
13.  Id. at 14. 
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with statistical analyses, the EEOC used AT&T to model employment 
discrimination systemically and nationwide.14 The AT&T settlement also set 
numerical hiring goals and timetables for their fulfillment.15 According to 
Ackerman, the acceptance of the AT&T case in the executive branch and 
Congress secured the legitimacy of using numerical measures to remedy, not 
only identify and prove, employment discrimination.16 
Ackerman is right to highlight the significance of the AT&T settlement. As 
described above, it was the kind of lightning-rod case that could generate the 
public and governmental response that fuels Ackerman’s theory. Going 
forward, it also became the template for government enforcement of Title 
VII.17 During the summer of 1973, the EEOC filed 150 cases against major 
corporations and assembled a national team of lawyers to “do the same thing as 
[AT&T] all over again.”18 As Ackerman observes, over the next few years, the 
EEOC secured court-approved consent decrees implementing similar number-
based remedies in a range of industries.19 
The AT&T case, however, also illuminates unexplored tensions within 
Ackerman’s argument. In the two years after the federal district court approved 
the AT&T agreement, a number of the company’s unions petitioned the court 
to modify its consent decree.20 They contended, among other things, that by 
imposing numerical goals, the consent decree violated Title VII and the 
Constitution’s equal protection guarantees.21 The district court easily dismissed 
 
14.  Phyllis A. Wallace, Introduction, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE AT&T CASE 
1, 2 (Phyllis A. Wallace ed., 1976); Christopher Lydon, Job Bias at Bell Charged by Panel: 
20,000-Page Report Finds Women Are Oppressed – Policy on Blacks Scored, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 
1971, at A1. 
15.  EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1032 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
16.  ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 182-83, 189-91. This claim may require more 
development since the AT&T settlement occurred after, rather than before, Congress 
amended Title VII in 1972. 
17.  See generally LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6; STOCKFORD, supra note 6, 
at 209-10; Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking, supra note 6. 
18.  Levine, supra note 4, at G1. Months before the AT&T settlement, Congress had amended 
Title VII to give the EEOC the authority to bring lawsuits challenging private employers’ 
discrimination. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat. 103, 107 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c)-(e) (2006)). 
19.  ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 183; see, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 330 n.4 (1977). 
20.  EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1028-29 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
21.  Id. at 1030-33. They brought their claims under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
per the Supreme Court’s holding that this Clause incorporated equal protection principles. 
 
 
a revolution at war with itself? 
2969 
 
their claims in 1976, citing abundant precedent.22 The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals quickly affirmed, but cautioned that preferential remedies were not 
categorically constitutional and “must be held invalid under the . . . Fifth 
Amendment unless” they satisfied “strict scrutiny.”23 In the appeals court’s 
judgment, the AT&T agreement met this test.24 The Supreme Court had not 
yet applied strict scrutiny to racial preferences adopted to remedy or prevent 
discrimination.25 But over the next decade, the Supreme Court found an 
increasing number of preferential schemes to be unconstitutional.26 During 
this same period, the Court gave greater leeway to preferences under  
Title VII.27 
The “reverse-state-action” and “government-by-numbers” aspects of 
Ackerman’s constitutional revolution were on a collision course. With 
preferential treatment more liberally allowed under Title VII than under the 
Constitution, using numbers to address employment discrimination became 
incompatible with applying the Constitution to the private sector. Instead, 
ensuring that the state action doctrine “insulate[d] ‘private’ actors from the 
[Constitution’s] egalitarian principles” ended up protecting the “government-
by-numbers” approach to employment discrimination.28 
Part I explains in greater depth Ackerman’s claim that the civil rights 
revolution included a major reworking of the state action doctrine and an 
embrace of numerical approaches to achieving equality. It also explains why 
employment is a particularly ripe site to explore the tensions between them. 
Part II demonstrates how the Court’s preservation of the nineteenth-century 
state action doctrine helped preserve the use of numbers to achieve equality in 
the workplace when employers’ voluntary use of preferences first came before 
the Court in the 1970s. Part III explains how this state action shield further 
protected these preferences in the 1980s, both before the Supreme Court and 
within President Ronald Reagan’s administration. Part IV argues that the state 
 
Id. at 1044-45 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)). 
22.  Id. at 1044-51, 1053-54. 
23.  EEOC v. AT&T, 556 F.2d 167, 179 (3d Cir. 1977). 
24.  Id. at 179-80. The Supreme Court denied review. Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. EEOC, 438 
U.S. 915 (1978); Tel. Coordinating Council, TCC-1, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. EEOC, 
438 U.S. 915 (1978); Alliance of Indep. Tel. Unions v. EEOC, 438 U.S. 915 (1978). 
25.  See infra Part III. 
26.  See id. 
27.  See id. 
28.  ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 13. 
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action doctrine could once again rescue voluntary employer preferences. The 
Conclusion raises some possible implications of this history for the stability of 
the civil rights revolution Ackerman documents and for his broader theory of 
constitutional change. 
i .  reverse state action and government by numbers in 
ackerman’s revolution  
Ackerman’s civil rights revolution has three key characteristics: it took a 
“sphere-by-sphere” approach to codifying the Constitution’s equality 
guarantee, it employed “government by numbers” to achieve this constitutional 
goal (albeit to varying degrees in each of the spheres), and it extended this 
constitutional mandate to the private sector. The result was targeted statutes 
and tailored administrative regimes customized to the particular structures of 
inequality in voting, public education, housing, public accommodations, and 
employment. As I explain below, these latter two characteristics coincided to 
the greatest degree in employment, making it a prime site to explore the 
tensions between them. 
A. Sphere by Sphere 
Ackerman argues that the Supreme Court’s increasingly consistent 
insistence that equal protection is achieved through colorblind policies betrays 
a central tenet of the civil rights revolution.29 Ackerman traces this tenet back 
to Chief Justice Earl Warren’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.30 “In 
making its case against ‘separate-but-equal,’” Ackerman contends, Brown’s 
reasoning “doesn’t apply to all social relationships across the board” but 
instead “requires the law to single out crucial spheres for the vindication of 
equality.”31 When Congress enacted a series of civil rights statutes in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, it adopted this approach, Ackerman argues, “self-consciously 
 
29.  ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 231; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 861-65 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (characterizing 
the plurality’s colorblind approach as “risk[ing] serious harm to the law and for the 
Nation”); cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579-80 (2009) (“Whatever the City’s ultimate 
aim—however well intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed—the City made its 
employment decision because of race.”). 
30.  ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 129-33 (describing the “sphere-by-sphere 
approach” articulated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
31.  ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 131. 
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divid[ing] the world into different spheres of life: public accommodations, 
education, employment, housing, voting.”32 Congress’s goal in each sphere was 
the same: “the pursuit of real equality of opportunity.”33 But Congress had a 
“contextual understanding of the constitutional meaning of equality in 
different spheres of social and political life.”34 As a result, it “displayed great 
creativity in crafting different administrative setups for different spheres,” 
which in turn “led to the development of different rules and principles in 
different spheres.”35 For Ackerman, it was these “landmark statutes,” with their 
sphere-by-sphere approach, not the Court’s increasingly formalist, 
homogenous approach to equality in decisions such as Loving v. Virginia, that 
defined the civil rights revolution and merit “full constitutional status.”36 
B. Government by Numbers 
Congress, the executive branch, and the courts deployed “government by 
numbers” to varying degrees in each sphere of discrimination they targeted. 
One of Ackerman’s great insights is how the civil rights revolution brought the 
technocratic impulse of the New Deal to bear on the problem of racial 
inequality.37 Government by numbers was used, Ackerman argues, only where 
necessary “to bridge the yawning gap between the law on the books and the 
law of ordinary life.”38 Generally, this involved discrimination by “institutions 
whose internal logics of decision are opaque”39 or who were structurally 
disinclined to comply.40 Government by numbers was used paradigmatically in 
the Voting Rights Act, which “imposed hard-edged output tests on voting 
registrars” and extensive federal supervision on those that failed.41 In contrast, 
 
32.  Id. at 12. 
33.  Id. at 154. 
34.  Id. at 12. 
35.  Id. at 155. 
36.  Id. at 34; see also id. at 291 (“I do deny that Loving deserves a central place in the civil rights 
canon. It simply represents an effort by We the Judges to fill in a gap left in the wake of an 
epochal set of decisions by We the People.”). 
37.  Id. at 14. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. at 159. 
40.  Id. at 154-73. 
41.  Id. at 194. As Ackerman observes, the Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
2612 (2013), which struck down the Voting Rights Act provision that set the formula used to 
determine the states that must preclear changes to their voting laws with the Department of 
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it played no role in policing public accommodations, where discrimination was 
patent and the market rewarded compliance.42 Here, Congress “principally 
relied on traditional lawsuits by traditional plaintiffs before traditional courts 
using traditional legal language to attack discrimination.”43 
But government by numbers was not an all or nothing proposition, 
Ackerman reveals. True to the sphere-by-sphere approach, in the case of 
employment discrimination, the civil rights revolution settled on an 
intermediate position. As initially enacted, Title VII focused on individual 
intentional discrimination and forbade numerical quotas, “the hard-edged 
version of government by numbers” used in voting.44 But Congress did not 
banish numbers entirely. They could be—and were—used as evidence of 
discriminatory intent,45 to identify suspicious employer policies, and to target 
the EEOC’s limited enforcement resources on the “worst offenders.”46 The 
EEOC also used them to demonstrate that discrimination was a systemic, not 
individual or intentional, problem.47 These uses in turn encouraged businesses 
to tend to their numbers and to adopt policies that lowered any numerical red 
flags. “Within the setting of the modern enterprise,” Ackerman observes, 
“discriminatory intentions had become a numbers-driven affair.”48 First the 
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power,49 then Congress and President 
Richard Nixon endorsed these uses of numbers in the 1972 amendments to 
Title VII.50 The result was a cascade of firms seeking consent decrees, adopting 
affirmative action programs, and being subject to judgments that used 
numbers to create preferences for hiring, training, and promoting minorities 
and women.51 
 
Justice, has thrown into doubt the future viability of government by numbers under the 
Voting Rights Act. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 328-35. 
42.  ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 159. 
43.  Id. at 195. 
44.  Id. at 177. 
45.  Id. at 174. 
46.  Id. at 186. 
47.  Id. at 189. 
48.  Id. at 187. For similar accounts of corporate practices, see generally JENNIFER DELTON, 
RACIAL INTEGRATION IN CORPORATE AMERICA, 1940-1990 (2009); and FRANK DOBBINS, 
INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2011). 
49.  401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 184-86 (discussing 
Griggs). 
50.  See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 189-91. 
51.  See infra Part III. 
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C. Reverse State Action 
Another central claim of Ackerman’s is that the civil rights revolution cast 
aside the state action limit on the Constitution’s equality guarantee. Ackerman 
argues that the Supreme Court “was on the verge of dispatching the state 
action doctrine in its 1964 decision in Bell v. Maryland,” a case involving the 
trespassing convictions of sit-in protesters at a Baltimore, Maryland 
restaurant.52 But he acknowledges that it “refrained at the last minute since 
Congress was poised to take leadership on this issue with the Civil Rights 
Act.”53 Nor did the Court in his account later take the step it had avoided in 
Bell. Nonetheless, he contends that the “state action restriction simply doesn’t 
make sense of the living Constitution.”54 For Ackerman, the Constitution 
includes the commitments “expressed in the landmark [civil rights] statutes.”55 
And these “requir[ed] private actors as well as state officials to accept wide-
ranging responsibilities to realize the principles of constitutional equality.”56 
Indeed, from Title VII, to the Civil Rights Act’s public accommodations title, 
to the Fair Housing Act, these statutes engaged in what Ackerman calls 
“reverse state action,” singling out the private sector.57 Ackerman notes that 
“[t]he current legal community uses Bell’s deference to Congress as an excuse 
for pretending that the state action doctrine of the nineteenth century remains 
intact.”58 He urges, however, that doing so is “[a] big mistake.”59 
 
52.  Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 13. A 
majority of Justices nearly coalesced around finding that the state’s arrest and conviction of 
the protesters at the behest of the restaurant’s private owner violated equal protection. Id. at 
143-47; LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript at ch. 7). Instead, 
the Court remanded the case to the state court to determine whether a public 
accommodations antidiscrimination law Maryland adopted after the protesters’ convictions 
rendered their sit-in legally protected. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
53.  ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 13. 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. at 175. Ackerman uses this term to refer to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which 
targeted discrimination in private employment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000e (2006). I use it 
here more broadly to refer to all regulation of private discrimination even under the Fair 
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31, Title II’s ban on discrimination in public 
accommodations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, and Title VII after it was amended in 1972 to reach 
public as well as private employment discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
58.  ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 13. 
59.  Id. at 176. 
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*  *  * 
Neither reverse state action nor government by numbers characterizes 
every sphere Ackerman analyzes. As explained above, reverse state action 
pertained only to employment, housing, and public accommodations; of these,  
government by numbers was employed most thoroughly in the employment 
discrimination context.60 Within the timeframe of Ackerman’s account, these 
two aspects of the civil rights revolution coexisted harmoniously. But no more 
than a few years thereafter, harmony gave way to conflict. 
i i .  the state action doctrine preserves government by 
numbers in weber   
When the Third Circuit applied strict scrutiny to the AT&T consent decree 
in 1977, it was stepping out ahead of the Supreme Court, which had yet to 
adopt this standard of review for racial preferences designed to remedy racial 
discrimination. But the next year, in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, the Court signaled that it was considering the Third Circuit’s approach 
and sounded a warning about remedial use of preferences under the landmark 
civil rights statutes.61 As this Part recounts, Bakke was but the opening salvo in 
a complicated, multi-front reconsideration of government by numbers in the 
employment context. Over the next decade, the government-by-numbers 
dimension of Title VII clashed repeatedly with the Supreme Court’s 
increasingly colorblind interpretations of the Constitution. When it came to 
employers’ voluntary use of preferences, the Court’s formalist, narrow 
approach to state action helped preserve the government-by-numbers 
approach. 
 
60.  Ackerman does not focus on the use of numbers in the housing context, but he briefly 
mentions the government’s use of a disparate impact standard. Id. at 222. As a result, I too 
focus on the coincidence of reverse state action and government by numbers in the 
employment context only. The Court may soon confront the issues raised by this 
coincidence in the housing context. See Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Garden Citizens in 
Action, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) (mem.) (dismissing after settlement a challenge in which 
the constitutionality of disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act was 
questioned). 
61.  438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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A. The Growing Constitutional Threat to Racial Preferences 
Racial preferences in hiring, promotion, and training were already 
controversial in 1973 when the EEOC entered into its pathbreaking agreement 
with AT&T. In 1972, both presidential candidates denounced the use of quotas 
and even some prominent liberals criticized the Nixon administration’s use of 
hiring goals.62 The Nixon Administration described the former as a number 
that “managers are obligated to attain” and the latter as one that would 
“probably be met.”63 To liberal opponents of quotas, however, this was a 
distinction without a difference. They thought that goals often functioned as 
“de facto quotas.” Even more fundamentally, however, they opposed any 
departure from meritocratic hiring. From this baseline, probable goals were no 
better than mandatory quotas.64 Labor leaders also criticized hiring goals, let 
alone quotas, for harmfully pitting white and black workers against each other. 
Guaranteeing jobs for all, not quotas, was the labor movement’s answer to 
African Americans’ limited job opportunities.65 Conservatives formulated a 
different critique, embracing colorblindness as the sine qua non of equal 
protection. Under this by now familiar formulation, recognizing race to 
remedy or prevent discrimination was constitutionally equivalent to 
recognizing race in order to discriminate.66 
Bakke signaled the rising influence of the colorblind approach. In that case, 
the Court was asked to determine whether a university program setting a 
 
62.  LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript at ch. 8); Lee, Race, Sex, and 
Rulemaking, supra note 6, at 862. 
63.  Memorandum from the National Executive Council of the United States Civil Service 
Commission to the Heads of Departments and Agencies (May 11, 1971) (on file with 
author). 
64.  Am. Jewish Comm., “Statement on Affirmative Action,” Dec. 3, 1972, LCCR Papers, Part I, 
Box 114, “Quota Hiring: Affirmative Action, 1972” Folder. For more thorough treatments of 
liberal Jewish groups’ disagreements over and critiques of quotas, see DENNIS DESLIPPE, 
PROTESTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION (2012); LAURA KALMAN, RIGHT STAR RISING: A NEW POLITICS, 1974-1980, at 
183-84, 191-94 (2010); and NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF 
THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 185-224 (2008). 
65.  For a nuanced account of labor’s position on affirmative action, see DESLIPPE, supra note 64. 
For additional general treatments of the complicated politics of affirmative action, see 
JEFFERSON COWIE, STAYIN’ ALIVE: THE 1970S AND THE LAST DAYS OF THE WORKING CLASS, 
240-43 (2010); and Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004). 
66.  On the rise of colorblind conservatives, see DESLIPPE, supra note 64; and MACLEAN, supra 
note 64, at ch. 7. 
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minimum quota for minority admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause 
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.67 The Justices splintered so 
thoroughly that it was hard to conclude anything definite from the decision 
other than that the admissions program was illegal. But in the Court’s first 
decision reviewing voluntary race-conscious measures adopted to remedy or  
prevent discrimination, colorblind arguments were key. Justice Powell 
endorsed a colorblind interpretation of equal protection, calling for strict 
scrutiny any time the government treated people differently based on their 
race.68 He found that the admissions policy failed this standard.69 Four other 
Justices avoided the constitutional question by interpreting Title VI in equally 
ominous, and fatal, colorblind terms.70 
When the Court considered a similar quota-based training program 
adopted by a private sector employer and union the next term, it seemed 
possible that the Court would strike it down under a colorblind approach to 
Title VII, equal protection, or both. Title VII had already been interpreted in 
ways that defied a strictly colorblind approach, giving the program a better 
chance under Title VII than it would have had under Title VI.71 But this would 
only remove the dodge used by the Justices who struck down the admissions 
program in Bakke on statutory grounds. That a constitutional decision would 
be close was near certain: Bakke had been a five-four decision.72 That 
 
67.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (1964) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006)). 
68.  See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“Racial 
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting 
judicial examination.”). 
69.  See id. at 320. Powell also stated, however, that some uses of race in the admissions context 
might be constitutional. See id. at 314-19. 
70.  See id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he 
meaning of the Title VI ban . . . is crystal clear: Race cannot be the basis of excluding anyone 
from participation in a federally funded program.”). Powell reached the constitutional 
question because he held that Title VI’s bar on discrimination was coextensive with the 
constitutional bar on discriminatory state action. See id. at 287 (plurality opinion). 
71.  See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977) (“[T]he Court has 
repeatedly held that a prima facie Title VII violation may be established by policies or 
practices that are neutral on their face and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in 
effect against a particular group.”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971) 
(recognizing disparate impact theories of discrimination as cognizable under Title VII). 
72.  The four dissenting Justices agreed with Justice Powell that Title VI “prohibits only those 
uses of racial criteria that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if employed by a State 
or its agencies.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). They would have applied 
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colorblind constitutionalists would command a majority striking the training 
program down was entirely possible. Or at least, it would have been if the 
Supreme Court had recognized that the civil rights revolution had swept away 
the state action doctrine. 
B. Employer Preferences’ State Action Shield 
1. Narrowing State Action 
Kaiser Aluminum’s quota-based training program was saved from the 
constitutional gauntlet because the Supreme Court had not rejected the state 
action doctrine in or since Bell.73 The Court began broadening the definition of 
state action in the 1940s,74 and came close to vastly expanding it in Bell.75 Over 
the next several years, the Court continued to inch its way towards a more 
expansive understanding of state action,76 leading one court watcher to predict 
that the “radical changes in society . . . even now are tolling the demise of state 
action.”77 But this progression of decisions can overstate the doctrine’s 
vulnerability. Even liberals at the time were deeply divided over its fate.78 The 
Justices who signed on to the Court’s most expansive decisions insisted that 
they were preserving an intelligible line between public, constitutionally 
accountable actions and those that were private and thus free from 
constitutional scrutiny.79 When President Nixon replaced Earl Warren with a 
Chief Justice strongly opposed to state action’s expansive trend, he tipped the 
 
intermediate, not strict, scrutiny, however, and would have upheld the program on 
constitutional and statutory grounds. See id. at 326, 359, 362. 
73.  Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
74.  See LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript at ch. 4); Michael 
Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1991). 
75.  ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 143-49; accord LEE, THE WORKPLACE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript at ch. 7). 
76.  See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
77.  John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the “State Action” Limit on the Equal Protection 
Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855, 855 (1966). 
78.  For liberals’ divisions, see LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript 
at chs. 4-5, 7). For arguments that “regime politics” played an underappreciated role in the 
doctrine’s preservation, see Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 273 (2010). 
79.  See, e.g., Reitman, 387 U.S. at 378-81. For the Justices’ internal deliberations and concerns 
about state action in this period, see LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 
(manuscript at chs. 4, 7, 10). 
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balance firmly in favor of contraction. Over the course of the 1970s, the Court 
issued a series of decisions narrowing the circumstances under which state 
action would be found,80 the most recent of which was decided the same term 
as Bakke.81 
2. Dodging the Equal Protection Bullet in Weber 
This narrowed state action doctrine allowed the Court to avoid deciding 
the constitutionality of Kaiser’s training program. Writing for the majority in 
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, Justice Brennan began by noting that 
“[s]ince the Kaiser-USWA plan does not involve state action, this case does not 
present an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”82 He instead 
considered whether it furthered Title VII’s overarching purpose of opening 
jobs to African Americans. The state action divide otherwise critically informed 
Brennan’s analysis. In order to distance Title VII from Bakke’s colorblind 
interpretation of Title VI, Brennan insisted that Title VII as originally enacted 
“regulate[d] purely private decisionmaking and was not intended to 
incorporate and particularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”83 When divining Title VII’s purpose, Brennan emphasized that 
Congress had sought to “avoid undue federal regulation of private businesses,” 
most notably by not “limit[ing] traditional business freedom to such a degree 
as to prohibit all voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action.”84 Justice 
Rehnquist accused Brennan of a “Houdini”-like opinion that “eludes clear 
statutory language [prohibiting racial discrimination], uncontradicted 
 
80.  See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (articulating the “close nexus” 
test); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 119-20 (1973) 
(distinguishing between encouragement and permission and finding the latter insufficient 
to implicate state action); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972) (rejecting 
the licensing theory of state action); LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 
(manuscript at ch. 10). 
81.  Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
82.  United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979). For arguments that, under 
a more expansive definition of state action, the union would be a state actor, see LEE, THE 
WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript at ch. 13). 
83.  Weber, 443 U.S. at 206 n.6. 
84.  Id. at 207. Brennan’s emphasis on managerial freedom was apparently critical to securing 
Justice Stewart’s vote and thus securing a majority decision with precedential value. 
Deborah C. Malamud, The Story of United Steelworkers of America v. Brian Weber, in 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 173, 212-16, 218-21 (Joel William Friedman ed., 
2006). 
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legislative history, and uniform precedent.”85 But a majority of the Court found 
that Title VII permitted the training program.86 
3. A Weber What If? 
By preventing the Court from considering the constitutionality of Kaiser’s 
program, the state action doctrine likely not only saved the program, but also 
either prevented a colorblind interpretation of Title VII or forestalled a strict 
scrutiny approach to affirmative action. The state action doctrine also 
channeled the Court in Weber towards an affirmative-action tolerant 
interpretation of Title VII that immunized voluntary employer preferences 
when they came under sustained attack in the 1980s. My argument relies 
entirely on counterfactual, which as a historian I am trained to distrust. But I 
am setting aside those compunctions and making a more lawyerly case. 
The first (if unlikely) threat was that the Court would avoid the 
constitutional question by adopting a colorblind interpretation of Title VII, as 
the concurring Justices had for Title VI in Bakke. Justices Powell and Stevens 
did not participate in Weber. Brennan wrote for the majority. Of the remaining 
six Justices, four (Thurgood Marshall, Potter Stewart, Byron White, and Harry 
Blackmun) joined Brennan’s interpretation of Title VII. Two of them would 
thus have had to defect on the statutory interpretation to avoid having to 
address the constitutional question. Only one, Stewart, had joined the 
colorblind interpretation of Title VI in Bakke.87 For reasons discussed further 
below, White might have provided the second vote, securing a colorblind 
interpretation of Title VII. 
If the constitutional question had been reached rather than avoided, it was 
quite possible (if far from certain) that the Court would have done what it had 
refrained from doing in Bakke: hold that preferences triggered strict scrutiny. 
This is where my counterfactual gets the most questionable from a historian’s 
perspective, because it relies not on predicting the future based on the past, but 
the past based on the future.88 But here goes. Although Weber did not press the 
 
85.  Weber, 443 U.S. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
86.  Id. at 201-02 (majority opinion). 
87.  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 416 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
88.  Of course, Weber may have affected the Court’s approach in its later equal protection cases, 
adding a degree of circularity to my argument. I find it unlikely that this occurred as none of 
the Justices viewed Weber as involving state action or the private employers and government 
certified unions it concerned as being state actors and thus none saw the case as implicating 
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constitutional question, Bakke was just the first in a steady stream of cases in 
which the Court considered the constitutionality of various affirmative action 
programs. In fact, one year after Weber, the Court considered a minority set-
aside for federal contracts in Fullilove v. Klutznick.89 Of the seven Justices 
participating in Weber, two—Justices Rehnquist and Stewart—subjected the 
federal affirmative action program to strict scrutiny in Fullilove.90 Three, 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, favored applying intermediate 
scrutiny.91 That leaves Chief Justice Burger and Justice White. Both declined to 
decide the proper level of scrutiny to apply in Fullilove, finding the program 
passed muster under either.92 
There are good reasons to predict that a majority in our hypothetical Weber 
would favor strict scrutiny. Over the course of the 1980s, first Burger and then 
White signed on to the strict scrutiny standard.93 Burger’s initial openness to 
applying intermediate scrutiny to the federal affirmative action program in 
Fullilove did not mean that he would have backed a lower level of scrutiny in 
Weber. Instead, his opinion in Fullilove repeatedly emphasized the special 
deference the Court owed Congress as a co-equal branch and the uniquely 
 
equal protection doctrine. Even if Weber did affect the Justices’ later approach to affirmative 
action under the equal protection doctrine, however, it likely limited rather than exaggerated 
the Court’s scrutiny. In other words, it is hard to imagine that if the Kaiser plan had been 
found instead to violate Title VII, the Court would have subsequently applied lesser rather 
than greater scrutiny to public affirmative action programs or found the ambit of permissible 
programs greater under equal protection than under Title VII. If the actual Weber decision 
had any effect on subsequent equal protection doctrine, therefore, it most likely minimized 
rather than maximized the Court’s scrutiny. If the hypothetical Weber would fail under even 
the minimized scrutiny the actual Weber decision might have caused, the counterfactual is at 
least as strong if not stronger than if the actual Weber had no effect on the Court’s 
subsequent equal protection decisions. 
89.  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
90.  Id. at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Under our Constitution, any official action that treats a 
person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect and 
presumptively invalid.” (emphasis added)). Justices Powell and Stevens (though less clearly 
so) also would apply strict scrutiny. Id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 537 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
91.  Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
92.  Id. at 472 (plurality opinion). 
93.  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (affirming the use of strict 
scrutiny for racial preferences); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) 
(analyzing whether the layoff provision at issue serves a compelling government interest 
and is narrowly tailored). 
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broad scope of Congress’s remedial powers.94 His openness to applying 
intermediate scrutiny to the federal affirmative action program in Fullilove thus 
did not mean that he would have backed a lower level of scrutiny in Weber. 
Further supporting this outcome, Burger favored a colorblind interpretation of 
Title VI in Bakke and of Title VII in Weber.95 Justice White is a trickier case 
since he had favored intermediate scrutiny in Bakke. The fact that he chose to 
avoid the level of scrutiny question in Fullilove suggests that he was not 
wedded to intermediate scrutiny, however. Also, even before he signed on to 
strict scrutiny, he began finding that affirmative action policies denied equal 
protection, in agreement with the Justices that applied it.96 It is likely, then, 
that at least Chief Justice Burger and possibly Justice White would have 
provided the two remaining votes necessary to constitute a majority in favor of 
applying strict scrutiny in our counter-factual version of Weber. If they did, the 
fact that the non-participating Justice Powell was already on record supporting 
strict scrutiny would have made the full Court’s alignment on the issue appear 
secure.97 That the other non-participant, Justice Stevens, also seemed to 
embrace strict scrutiny the next year in Fullilove would have made the 
alignment starker.98 
 
94.  Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483; id. at 472. 
95.  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 416 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 
193, 217 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[U]nder the plain language of § 703(d), [a 
quota] is ‘an unlawful employment practice.’”). 
96.  United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 196 (1987) (White, J., dissenting); Wygant, 476 
U.S. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring). 
97.  See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
98.  Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Racial classifications are simply too 
pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and 
classification.”). Notably, if White instead backed intermediate scrutiny in Weber, as a 
matter of precedent, head-counting, and optics, the result would not have seemed as secure. 
First, Powell would likely have participated and joined on the side of strict scrutiny, making 
an evenly split court. See Malamud, supra note 84, at 215 n.126. Even if he did not, with only 
four votes in the majority, the decision would have had no precedential effect. Going 
forward, Stevens would be the decisive vote. Although he eventually switched sides, as of 
1979 he was most associated with the colorblind constitutionalists, making an application of 
intermediate scrutiny in Weber seem weak. Because the outcome would be non-precedential, 
it would have eliminated the actual Weber’s later protective effects, which are described 
below. Even if the Court somehow cobbled together a five-Justice majority for a statutory 
interpretation of Title VII akin to that adopted in the actual Weber decision, that 
interpretation would have been weaker than Weber’s. This is because, as the constitutional 
test in whose shadow the Court interpreted Title VII became more stringent, that statutory 
interpretation would appear weakened and more open for revision or repudiation. This 
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If the Court had applied strict scrutiny in Weber, it would almost definitely 
have found Kaiser’s program unconstitutional, demonstrating why preserving 
government by numbers in the workplace required creating space between the 
treatment of employer preferences under Title VII and equal protection. This 
step also involves counterfactual speculation, as the Court would settle on what 
standard to apply to affirmative action (strict scrutiny) before flushing out how 
to apply that standard.99 Applying Justice Powell’s test from Bakke and 
Fullilove, however, is probably a safe approach.100 As more Justices signed on to 
strict scrutiny during the 1980s, they complained that Powell’s version was not 
strict enough.101 If Weber would fail Powell’s test, therefore, it would likely fail 
any articulation of strict scrutiny. 
Under Powell’s approach, it is unlikely that the Court would have found 
that the Kaiser plan furthered a compelling interest. As an end in itself, 
“[r]acial preference never can constitute a compelling state interest,” Powell 
insisted.102 Nor was the diversity rationale Powell found compelling in Bakke 
advanced in Weber or clearly applicable, given Powell’s heavy reliance on 
factors particular to education.103 Powell did allow that “ameliorating, or 
 
might have eliminated some or all of the protective effects the actual Weber’s construction of 
Title VII had during the 1980s, most notably the weight it was given under the doctrine of 
stare decisis. 
99.  See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny 
to Richmond’s minority set-aside program but finding it “almost impossible to assess 
whether the Richmond Plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination since it is 
not linked to identified discrimination in any way”); see also Neal Devins, Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme Court Affirmative Action 
Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673, 698 (1996) (describing the Court’s affirmative action 
decisions as “indecisive, saying little that can be generalized beyond the facts of a particular 
dispute”). 
100.  Powell restated his application of strict scrutiny in Fullilove, relying primarily but not 
exclusively on Bakke. As it is more concise and clearly stated, I use his articulation of the test 
in Fullilove here. 
101.  See, e.g., Paradise, 480 U.S. at 197 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court adopts a 
standardless view of ‘narrowly tailored’ far less stringent than that required by strict 
scrutiny . . . .”). 
102.  Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 497 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
103.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15 (plurality opinion). Even if diversity were claimed and accepted, 
Powell made clear that a quota (also at issue in Weber) was not an acceptable means of 
advancing that interest. Id. at 319-20; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328, 334 
(2003) (accepting diversity as a compelling government interest but noting that “[t]o be 
narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system”); cf. 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at Work: A Title VII Critique of Constitutional 
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eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination” 
was a compelling interest.104 But he limited it to discrimination that was 
identified through “judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of 
constitutional or statutory violations.”105 As Powell found the university 
admissions office in Bakke incapable of making the predicate finding, he would 
of necessity find Kaiser Aluminum and its unions similarly incapacitated.106 In 
Weber, the Court took judicial notice, based on “numerous” lower court 
decisions, of the craft union discrimination said to explain Kaiser’s decision to 
adopt its plan.107 Perhaps our hypothetical Weber court would, as the actual 
one did, accept prior judicial findings of discrimination in lieu of findings by 
the institutionally incompetent policy adopter. This still would not save the 
Kaiser plan, however. The actual Weber court found “break[ing] down old 
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy” in “occupations which have been 
traditionally closed to” a protected class sufficient justification for employer 
preferences.108 But Powell insisted that countering this sort of “societal 
discrimination” could not justify a racial preference for strict scrutiny 
purposes.109 
 
Affirmative Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408, 1417 (2006) (noting that accepting diversity as a 
compelling interest is inconsistent with requiring individualized analysis and arguing that 
the Court’s “narrow-tailoring analysis . . . eschews numerical accountability”). 
104.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (plurality opinion). 
105.  Id.; see also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 497-98 (explaining that to establish a compelling interest, 
the governmental body imposing the racial preference has to be empowered to make a 
finding of discrimination and to have done so). 
106.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309-10 (plurality opinion) (“Petitioner does not purport to have made, 
and is in no position to make, such findings. . . . Lacking this capability, petitioner has not 
carried its burden of justification on this issue.”). 
107.  United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197-98 (1979). 
108.  Id. at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
109.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310 (plurality opinion) (“‘[S]ocietal discrimination’ does not justify a 
classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons . . . who bear no responsibility for 
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have 
suffered.”); see id. at 296 n.36; cf. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I agree with the plurality that a governmental agency’s interest 
in remedying ‘societal’ discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to its own 
actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster under strict 
scrutiny.”). The Court’s early affirmative action decisions allowed greater leeway for 
Congress to counter society-wide discrimination. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490; id. at 516 
(Powell, J., concurring). These decisions also suggested that a state or local legislative body 
might have some ability to “eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own 
legislative jurisdiction.” City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1989) 
(plurality opinion); see also Ian Ayres & Frederick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination 
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Even if Kaiser’s plan were somehow deemed to advance a compelling 
interest, it likely would have failed the narrow tailoring test. Some of the 
factors Weber considered to determine the plan’s comportment with Title VII 
were similar to those Powell employed under equal protection.110 Other factors 
were different but not in ways likely to lead to different outcomes.111 Powell’s 
narrow tailoring test imposed a unique criterion, however, which Kaiser’s plan 
would most certainly fail, even if it would stand under all the remaining 
 
Justify Public Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1607 n.108 (1998) (arguing that 
scholars have underestimated the room the Court left for affirmative action that redresses 
societal discrimination). But even if the Court had been willing to give an employer and 
union the same leeway as a legislature (itself fairly unthinkable), the Court held that “an 
amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular industry,” all that 
was claimed in Weber, “cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota.” Croson, 488 
U.S. at 499; see also id. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins 
of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1986) 
(observing that the Court “approved affirmative action only as precise penance for the 
specific sins of racism a government, union, or employer has committed in the past”). 
110.  For instance, both considered the duration of the preferences, with temporariness auguring 
in favor of permissibility. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring); Weber, 443 U.S. 
at 208. Both tests weighed the impact on “innocent third parties,” Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 514 
(Powell, J., concurring); Weber, 443 U.S. at 208, looking particularly askance at any plan 
that would require white workers’ layoff or discharge. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; see also 
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 182 (1987) (finding a 50% promotion quota 
narrowly tailored because it was not an “‘absolute bar’ to white advancement” and did not 
require layoffs or discharges); id. at 189 (Powell, J., concurring); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal 
Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 488 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Fullilove, 
448 U.S. at 514-15 (Powell, J., concurring); cf. Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (holding 
unconstitutional an affirmative action policy that called for white employees to be laid off 
before African American employees with less seniority). Although there is some question 
whether this factor is applied identically under Title VII and equal protection, I will assume 
the Kaiser plan could pass muster since the Court subsequently affirmed the 
constitutionality of a similar 50% promotion quota. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 183. That said, the 
long history of employer intransigence in Paradise suggests that the Court might have been 
more willing to tolerate the burden in Paradise than it would have been in Weber where no 
such history was involved. 
111.  Compare Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (requiring that the plan was “not intended to maintain 
racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance”), with Fullilove, 448 U.S. 
at 510 (Powell, J., concurring) (considering “the relationship between the percentage of 
minority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority group members in the 
relevant population or workforce”). Using this standard, goals set at or below the targeted 
group’s percentage of the relevant population or workforce easily passed muster. See Sheet 
Metal Workers’ Int’l, 478 U.S. at 487; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513-14 (Powell, J., concurring). 
But for the reasons given supra note 110 regarding the 50% quota in Paradise, I will assume 
Kaiser’s disproportionately large quota would have survived this prong as well, with a 
similar caveat regarding the generosity of this assumption. Paradise, 480 U.S at 179-81. 
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factors112: Powell’s test required that no alternative, less “trammeling” remedies 
were available.113 Indeed, in the cases where Powell was willing to find that a 
preference, let alone a disproportionately large quota like that used in the 
Kaiser plan, was narrowly tailored, he did so in part because more moderate 
remedies had been tried and failed.114 No such history existed at Kaiser.115 
*  *  * 
The Court might have adopted a colorblind interpretation of Title VII or 
found that the Kaiser plan violated equal protection had the state action 
doctrine not foreclosed this inquiry in Weber. But this thought experiment is 
about more than the fate of Kaiser’s voluntary quota. The attack on affirmative 
action began in earnest in the 1980s when the Reagan Justice Department set 
out to eliminate all racial preferences. That Weber had instead read Title VII to 
allow the Kaiser plan provided a bulwark for employers’ voluntary preferences 
during the 1980s attack. 
 
112.  Powell also uniquely required that the preferences scheme include “waiver provisions if the 
hiring plan could not be met, Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 511 (Powell, J., concurring), a 
requirement the Kaiser plan easily met because filling the quota was conditioned on there 
being sufficient qualified minority applicants, Weber, 443 U.S. at 223 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
113.  Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring). 
114.  Paradise, 480 U.S at 172-76; id. at 186, 188 (Powell, J., concurring); Sheet Metal Workers’ 
Int’l, 478 U.S. at 486-87. The Court has applied this requirement quite rigorously where 
legislatures were countering society-wide discrimination within their jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 784 (2007) (requiring, as a component of the 
least restrictive means prong, that the defendant “establish, in detail, how decisions based 
on an individual student’s race are made in a challenged governmental program”). 
115.  Most obviously, Kaiser did not first try an in-house training program without quotas or 
with proportional rather than super-proportional ones. Deborah Malamud reports that 
Kaiser had experimented with in-house training prior to the plan challenged in Weber, but it 
is not clear when it was tried, whether this training was available to minority applicants 
(Malamud describes evidence that it was operated on a discriminatory basis), or whether it 
was tried at the plant in which the quota plan was challenged. Malamud, supra note 84, at 
194, 209. Further, the parties had agreed at trial that prior to the quota plan, Kaiser had 
failed to provide in-house training at the plant at issue, so no prior efforts were in the 
record. Id. at 196-97. 
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i i i .  state action’s lingering protective effects  
The actual Weber decision allowed an employer to defend against a claim of 
reverse discrimination by establishing that its complained of actions were part 
of a Title VII-compliant affirmative action program. During the 1980s, this test 
helped preserve voluntary affirmative action under Title VII and opened a 
divide between its analysis under Title VII and equal protection. 
A. The Reagan Administration’s Attack on Preferences 
The legal attack on preferences, thus far waged by individuals and unions, 
got an enormous boost when President Reagan put the resources and 
considerable Supreme Court capital of the executive branch behind it. 
Immediately after taking office, Reagan assured that his “administration is 
going to be dedicated to equality” but opposed to any “affirmative action 
programs becoming quota systems.”116 Again, after reelection, he reminded the 
nation that he had run against quotas in both campaigns, and claimed a 
mandate to eliminate them.117 As President, he appointed opponents of racial 
preferences to key civil rights positions, including as Chairman of the Civil 
Rights Commission and the EEOC.118 
Reagan’s appointment of William Bradford Reynolds to head the Justice 
Department’s Civil Rights Division most threatened government by numbers 
under Title VII. Reynolds promptly critiqued “racial formulas, such as hiring 
quotas and fixed goals . . . in the work place.”119 These formulas “create[d] a 
caste system in which an individual must be unfairly disadvantaged for each 
person who is preferred,” Reynolds urged, and were “as offensive to standards 
of human decency today as they were some 84 years ago when countenanced 
 
116.  Ronald Reagan, The President’s News Conference (Jan. 29, 1981), http://www.presidency 
.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44101. 
117.  Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Civil Rights (June 15, 1985), http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=38782. 
118.  Ernest Holsendolph, Skills, Not Bias, Seen as Key for Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,  
1982, http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/03/us/skills-not-bias-seen-as-key-for-jobs.html; 
John T. McQuiston, Clarence M. Pendleton, 57, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,  
1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/06/obituaries/clarence-m-pendleton-57-dies-head 
-of-civil-rights-commission.html. 
119.  William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Att’y General, Civil Rights Division, Dep’t of Justice, 
Remarks at the Fourth Annual Conference on Equal Employment Opportunity: Recent 
Developments in Federal Regulations and Case Law 7 (Oct. 20, 1981), http://files.eric.ed 
.gov/fulltext/ED208160.pdf. 
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under Plessy v. Ferguson.”120 The White House quickly assembled a special task 
force on employment discrimination,121 and Reynolds publicly announced his 
desire to, as the Wall Street Journal put it, “get the Supreme Court to rule that it 
is illegal and unconstitutional to give minorities and women preference in 
hiring and promotion.”122 The administration’s attack would be wholesale. 
Reynolds “bridled at government-imposed preferences and ‘race-conscious 
relief,’ even as a remedy for proven discrimination.”123 Instead, remedies could 
benefit “only the individuals discriminated against. . . . Relief, as the tag went, 
must be victim-specific; if so it is color-blind, for it is predicated on victim 
status, not race.”124 Reconsidering Weber, limiting relief under Title VII, 
securing strict scrutiny for preferences, and ensuring that narrow tailoring 
would, with exceedingly minimal exceptions, be “fatal in fact”125—all would be 
on the administration’s sweeping agenda. 
In complicated ways, Reynolds’s plans were limited by the state action 
doctrine. Most obviously, the state action doctrine had secured Weber, a 
precedent that provided a drag on the administration’s attack over the course of 
the 1980s. 
B. Weber’s Protective Effects 
Weber delayed and sculpted the Reagan administration’s challenge to 
voluntary employer preferences and helped protect them once that attack 
occurred. 
 
120.  Id. at 8 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). 
121.  CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND 
ACCOUNT 105 (1991). 
122.  Robert E. Taylor, Civil Rights Division Head Will Seek Supreme Court Ban on Affirmative 
Action, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1981, at A4. 
123.  FRIED, supra note 121, at 105. 
124.  Id. 
125.  See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) 
(describing strict scrutiny as “fatal in fact”). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
(upholding Michigan Law School’s racially conscious admissions program under strict 
scrutiny); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (rejecting the idea 
that strict scrutiny is “fatal in fact”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62 
(1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (“[O]ur review under the Fourteenth Amendment should be strict—not 
‘strict in theory and fatal in fact,’ because it is stigma that causes fatality—but strict and 
searching nonetheless.” (quoting Gunther, supra)). 
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1. Equal Protection Not Title VII; Public Not Private 
With Weber so recently decided, the Reagan administration initially 
avoided the issue of voluntary employer preferences under Title VII. When 
Reynolds laid out his agenda in 1981, he opined that “Weber is wrongly 
decided” and expressed hope that, were the Court to revisit the issue, “it would 
arrive at a different conclusion.”126 He also spoke out against all uses of 
“statistical formulae” in the workplace.127 But attacking voluntary employer 
preferences under Title VII would not be the administration’s immediate 
goal.128 For the most part, the administration challenged courts’ authority to 
order—not employers’ leeway to voluntarily adopt—affirmative action 
programs.129 To the extent that Reynolds focused on voluntary preferences, he 
pledged to fight for constitutional constraints on their use and focused on 
public, not private, employers.130 For instance, the government sought 
unsuccessfully to intervene before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in a 
challenge to an affirmative action policy adopted by the Detroit Police 
Department.131 As the Los Angeles Times reported, the Justice Department 
argued “that public employers are barred by the Constitution from voluntarily 
setting up promotion plans based on race, even though the Supreme Court [in 
Weber] approved them for private employers.”132 
Further, when Reynolds subsequently targeted voluntary employer 
preferences under Title VII during Reagan’s second term, he sought to 
 
126.  See Taylor, supra note 122. 
127.  William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Att’y General, Civil Rights Division, Dep’t of Justice, 
Remarks Before the 1983 Mid-Winter Meeting of the American Bar Association Equal 
Employment Law Committee 7 (Mar. 4, 1983) (on file with author); see also Reynolds, supra 
note 119 (critiquing the “use of racial formulas” in the workplace). 
128.  Indeed, in 1981, Reynolds reassured a House Subcommittee that “the Weber case is now the 
law. It would be improper and irresponsible of me to act in a way that is contrary to the 
law.” NORMAN C. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 136 n.131 
(1988). 
129.  Administration Challenges Minority Plan, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1983, at B18. See, e.g., Brief of 
the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Firefighters Local Union No. 
1784 v. Carl W. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (No. 82-206) (1984), http://www.justice.gov 
/osg/briefs/1983/sg830186.txt. 
130.  Taylor, supra note 122. 
131.  Bratton v. City of Detroit, 712 F.2d 222, 223 n.1 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting that the Justice 
Department had submitted an amicus brief in support of granting rehearing that arrived 
after a majority of the Court had already voted to deny). 
132.  Administration Challenges Minority Plan, supra note 129. 
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circumvent Weber by challenging public employer programs. Reynolds’s 
influence grew after Reagan’s reelection, as he joined the Justice Department’s 
litigation steering committee and his protégés from the Civil Rights Division 
moved into influential positions in the Department.133 He also gained a 
powerful ally in Edwin Meese, a close adviser of Reagan’s who became 
Attorney General in 1985. Meese quickly declared that “[c]ounting by race is a 
form of racism.”134 The Reagan administration, he asserted, “reject[ed] . . . 
unequivocally” the argument that affirmative action required “race-conscious, 
preferential treatment.”135 Instead, using “racially preferential quotas . . . is 
nothing short of a legal, moral and constitutional tragedy.”136 Upon reelection, 
Reagan specifically singled out for attack the use of voluntary quotas under 
Title VII, declaring them “exactly what the civil rights laws were designed to 
stop.”137 
Reagan’s Justice Department did not challenge Weber head on, however. 
Instead, it built on Justice Rehnquist’s unusual dissent when the Court in 1985 
declined to review an appellate court decision upholding a state’s voluntary 
preferences under Weber.138 Rehnquist quoted Weber’s caveat that Kaiser’s plan 
“does not involve state action” and urged that the Court should address how 
the presence of state action affected the Weber framework.139 The preferences’ 
violation of equal protection was not at issue in the denied petition, Rehnquist 
acknowledged. But he urged that “when a state employer claims that arguably 
discriminatory conduct on its part is nonetheless authorized by Title VII, the 
claim of such statutory authorization must be considered in the light of the 
 
133.  See DOUGLAS KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE 
DEPARTMENT 153 (1992). 
134.  Edwin Meese, Att’y General, Constitution Day Speech at Dickinson College 19 (Sept. 17, 
1985), http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/meese/1985/09-17-1985.pdf. 
135.  Id. at 17. 
136.  Id. at 18. 
137.  Reagan, supra note 117. On the Reagan administration’s anti-affirmative action policies 
generally, see DOBBINS, supra note 48, at 133-38; FRIED, supra note 121, at ch. 4; KMIEC, supra 
note 133, at ch. 7; and MACLEAN, supra note 64, at 300-05. 
138.  Bushey v. N.Y. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 733 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that under Weber a 
state agency could separately normalize the scores of minority and nonminority takers of a 
qualifying exam in order to avoid disproportionate numbers of nonminority candidates for 
promotion), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1117 (1985). 
139.  Bushey, 469 U.S. at 1117 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979)). 
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prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.”140 Even if Congress intended 
private employers to have the leeway to adopt voluntary preferences that Weber 
provided, Rehnquist contended that it could not have intended to allow state 
and local employers “to claim that their actions were shielded under Title VII 
even if the actions would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”141 It was this 
narrower point only that Reynolds pursued during Reagan’s second term.142 
2. Precedential Effects 
When the Justice Department eventually challenged public employers’ 
voluntary preferences under Title VII, Weber helped protect them. Most 
directly, only because of stare decisis did a majority of the Court find that the 
public employer preference at issue in Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
comported with Title VII.143 Without Justice Stevens’s joinder, Justice 
Brennan’s opinion would not have commanded a majority of the Court. 
Stevens joined despite believing that Weber was wrongly decided.144 Weber, 
however, was now “an important part of the fabric of our law,” Stevens 
explained, which he found a “sufficiently compelling” reason to “adhere to [its] 
basic construction of” Title VII.145 That Weber was already on the books also 
secured Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in the judgment, decisively ensuring 
the continued viability of voluntary employer preferences under Title VII.146 
With the remaining three Justices all in favor of reversing Weber, its existence 
is all that saved the Court from adopting a colorblind interpretation of Title VII 
in Johnson. 
 
140.  Id. at 1121. 
141.  Id. 
142.  This was despite calls for a check on private employers’ use of preferences. See, e.g., Herman 
Belz, What the Supreme Court Means on Racial Quotas, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1984, at F7. 
President Reagan similarly focused only on public employers in his 1985 civil rights address 
arguing that voluntary quotas were contrary to Title VII. Reagan, supra note 117 (criticizing 
those who “tell us that the Government should enforce discrimination in favor of some 
groups through hiring quotas”). 
143.  480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
144.  See id. at 643-44 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
145.  Id. at 644. 
146.  See id. at 648 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Public employer preferences, as commentators 
noted, still hung under equal protection’s ominous cloud. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Affirmative 
Action After Reagan, 68 TEX. L. REV. 353, 368 (1989). 
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Less tangibly, Weber shielded voluntary preferences through what might be 
called the first-mover advantage. While hardly a formal canon of construction, 
where other statutes regulated similar conduct but only some involved state 
action, the Court’s initial interpretation has bled across the state action line 
regardless of the different constitutional stakes.147 Imagine if the Court in 
Johnson had been considering for the first time voluntary employer preferences 
under Title VII or that my hypothetical Weber had produced a splintered Court 
akin to that in Bakke, with neither a constitutional nor statutory ground 
prevailing. If so, this first authoritative interpretation of Title VII would have 
occurred deeply in the Constitution’s shadow. Indeed, the government and a 
dissenting Justice Scalia urged the Court in Johnson to follow the approach 
Rehnquist had suggested previously and read equal protection limits into Title 
VII.148 For the reasons discussed in the Weber hypothetical, this would have led 
to a narrower ambit for voluntary employer preferences.149 This more crabbed 
interpretation, in turn, might have then been applied in the private employer 
context due to the first-mover effect.150 Instead, the inertial path ran in the 
other direction: the Court swept aside equal protection concerns in Johnson,151 
 
147.  For instance, under the federal labor laws, the Supreme Court first interpreted the Railway 
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C § 152 (2006), to bar unions from using money collected from the 
workers they represented for political purposes to which those workers objected. See Int’l 
Assoc. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). In doing so, the Court avoided First 
Amendment issues that would have been raised had the statute not been so interpreted. Id. 
at 750; see also Railway Employees’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (reserving 
judgment with respect to cases where “the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is 
used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the 
First Amendment”). That interpretation was then extended as a matter of First Amendment 
doctrine to public sector workers organized under similar state law provisions, Abood v. 
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 226 (1977), and later to private sector workers organized 
under an entirely different statute, the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 
(2012), where neither the direct nor avoided constitutional issues pertained, Commc’ns 
Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). 
148.  Johnson, 480 U.S. 616, 664-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (No. 85-1129), 1986 WL 728148 
at *11 (“Victim specific, make whole relief is the natural and usual remedial corollary to the 
substantive ‘individual rights’ principle of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
149.  Cf. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (striking down a layoff preference 
under equal protection in part because it targeted societal as opposed to employer-specific 
discrimination). 
150.  See supra note 147. 
151.  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620 n.2. 
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and applied Weber’s test, emphatically crafted for the private sector, to the 
public employer involved.152 
*  *  * 
Thanks to the Court’s narrow, formal approach to state action, during the 
1980s, Title VII preserved space for voluntary preferences by private employers 
that were no longer available to public employers under equal protection. 
Going forward, even the Reagan Justice Department conceded that the test 
under Title VII was more permissive than under equal protection.153 
iv.  state action to the rescue again? 
In 2009 the Supreme Court in Ricci v. DeStefano did what it had refused to 
do in Johnson: interpret Title VII in light of equal protection standards.154 Ricci 
involved a reverse discrimination claim against a city for deciding not to certify 
the results of a promotion exam on which “white candidates had outperformed 
minority candidates.”155 In defense, city officials argued that, if “they had 
certified the results, they could have faced liability under Title VII for adopting 
a practice that had a disparate impact on the minority firefighters.”156 The 
Court avoided applying equal protection directly by finding the city’s actions 
violated Title VII.157 Equal protection nonetheless crept into the Court’s 
analysis, as Justices Rehnquist and Scalia as well as the Reagan administration 
 
152.  Id. at 627 (“The assessment of the legality of the Agency Plan must be guided by our 
decision in Weber.”). Although beyond the scope of this essay, Weber also helped protect 
judicial use of numbers-based remedies under Title VII when they also came under attack in 
the 1980s. See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448, 453, 
463, 479 (1986). 
153.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES 
AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 49 (1988). 
154.  557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
155.  Id. at 562. 
156.  Id. at 563. Disparate impact liability can attach if an employer adopts a practice that 
disproportionately disadvantages protected workers unless the employer demonstrates that 
the practice is a “business necessity” and the plaintiff cannot identify a less discriminatory 
alternative. Id. at 577-78 (discussing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2006))). 
157.  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563.  
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had urged it should in the 1980s.158 How broadly Ricci sweeps is as yet 
unclear.159 As courts work this question out, the state action doctrine could 
once again shield some voluntary employer preferences. 
Ricci newly imports equal protection standards into Title VII analysis of 
employers’ preferential practices. Finding that Title VII’s disparate impact and 
disparate treatment provisions were “in conflict absent a rule to reconcile 
them,”160 the Court turned to “cases similar to this one, albeit in the context of 
the Equal Protection Clause.”161 Specifically, Ricci borrowed these equal 
protection cases’ requirement that an employer have a “‘strong basis in 
evidence’ that [its] remedial actions were necessary” before a court will find the 
employer’s race-conscious efforts to remedy past racial discrimination 
constitutional.162 Translated into the Title VII context, in order to escape 
liability, Ricci required an employer to have a strong basis in evidence that its 
abandoned practices either “were not job related and consistent with business 
necessity, or” if they were, that “there existed an equally valid, less-
discriminatory alternative that” the employer had “refused to adopt.”163 
Thus far, Ricci has not spelled the end of voluntary employer preferences 
but it has created the need to distinguish the preferences to which the 
framework applies. Ricci does not mention Johnson or Weber,164 and the Ricci 
dissenters explicitly distinguish the employer defense rejected therein from that 
allowed in Johnson and Weber.165 Whether that distinction will hold is as yet 
 
158.  See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
159.  Academic predictions about Ricci’s impact diverge widely. See, e.g., Barbara Jean D’Aquila, A 
Management Employment Lawyer’s Perspective on Ricci v. DeStefano, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
213, 221 (2010) (interpreting Ricci to indicate “that when the employer is undertaking 
voluntary affirmative action to achieve the objectives of Title VII, Ricci’s stricter strong-
basis-in-evidence standard should not apply and that prior affirmative action decisions 
remain valid”); Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 
(2010) (identifying two interpretations of Ricci compatible with disparate impact and one 
interpretation under which disparate impact conflicts with equal protection). 
160.  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580. 
161.  Id. at 582. 
162.  Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)). The Court 
states that it is only borrowing equal protection doctrine, which is seemingly different than 
finding that Title VII must be construed to comport with equal protection. As Richard 
Primus has argued, however, equal protection reasoning infects Ricci’s entire analysis, 
rendering the decision a de facto conflation of the two. Primus, supra note 159, at 1362. 
163.  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 587. 
164.  See id. 
165.  Id. at 626 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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undetermined. The majority opinion contains language that could sweep 
broadly to include preferences such as those in Weber and Johnson that are 
adopted to correct a “manifest imbalance” as well as language promising the 
decision’s narrow reach.166 Lower courts thus far have interpreted Ricci to 
apply only to public employer preferences adopted to avoid disparate impact 
liability.167 The Second Circuit has given the question its most extensive 
treatment, finding that the Weber/Johnson framework still applies if a public 
employer prospectively adopts preferences to benefit a protected class 
generally.168 
As yet unaddressed is the Ricci test’s application to private employers’ 
preferences, whether adopted to avoid disparate impact liability or to “break 
down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.”169 Whatever position 
the Supreme Court takes regarding the Second Circuit’s approach to public 
employers, the state action doctrine could (and indeed should) foreclose Ricci’s 
application to private employer preferences under either the disparate impact or 
 
166.  Compare id. at 583 (majority opinion) (“[T]he standard appropriately constrains employers’ 
discretion in making race-based decisions.”), with id. at 585 (“We hold only that, under Title 
VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of 
avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong 
basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the 
race-conscious, discriminatory action.”). 
167.  See, e.g., NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 484 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(distinguishing Ricci, where defendants had to choose between possible disparate impact 
liability and a definite disparate treatment action, from the instant case, in which “North 
Hudson face[d] a classic disparate-impact claim, one that we have resolved based on the 
three-step inquiry dictated by the statute”); United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 97-99, 
104 (2d Cir. 2011); Humphries v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 580 F.3d 688, 693-97 (8th 
Cir. 2009) (applying the Weber/Johnson framework to a school district’s affirmative action 
policies, including the use of biracial hiring committees as well as minority hiring goals and 
quotas); Shea v. Kerry, 961 F. Supp. 2d 17, 54 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Weber and Johnson while 
describing the standards by which courts analyze affirmative action plans and noting that 
“[w]hile the tide may be turning against this approach to affirmative action, it has yet to 
directly reach Johnson’s Title VII standard”); cf. Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200, 
208-09 (2d Cir. 2011) (construing Ricci not to allow employers to defend against disparate 
impact claims by asserting a “strong basis in evidence” that it would have been subject to 
disparate treatment liability). 
168.  Brennan, 650 F.3d at 104 (finding that Title VII’s disparate treatment provision “draws a 
distinction between affirmative action plans, which are intended to provide ex ante benefits to 
all members of a racial or gender class, and make-whole relief, which is intended to provide ex 
post benefits to specified individuals who have suffered discrimination,” and stating that the 
Weber/Johnson framework applies only to the former). 
169.  United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). 
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Weber/Johnson defense. The strong-basis-in-evidence test that Ricci borrowed 
is derived from strict scrutiny’s compelling interest prong.170 Even the Court’s 
conservative Justices (indeed, especially the Court’s conservative Justices) 
should find imposing this standard on private employers unwarranted. If Ricci 
did no more than borrow a standard from equal protection doctrine, then as a 
matter of statutory construction, this borrowing is less justified in the private 
sector. In Ricci, the only factor the Court weighed in favor of maximizing 
employer flexibility was “Congress’s intent that ‘voluntary compliance’ be ‘the 
preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII.’”171 Regarding private 
employers, however, an additional factor weighs in favor of flexibility and 
against Ricci’s borrowing: what Justice Brennan in Weber described as 
Congress’s desire to limit federal regulation of the private sector and maximize 
“traditional business freedom.”172 This desire derives from the same 
public/private divide that animates the traditional state action doctrine. 
As a matter of constitutional law, whether Ricci merely borrows equal 
protection doctrine or is conforming Title VII to it, the Justices in the Ricci 
majority should be loath to extend its test to private sector employers. If 
Congress intended equal protection doctrine to sculpt the scope of Title VII as 
applied to state and local employers has been debated since at least Johnson.173 
But whatever arguments this position has in its favor, they evaporate as regards 
the private sector—especially for those wedded to a narrow conception of state 
action. State and local employers’ voluntary preferences are undeniably 
infected with state action and Congress, in applying Title VII to them, relied 
on its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection 
provisions.174 In contrast, Congress grounded the Title VII provisions 
 
170.  See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (quoting Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)). 
171.  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 581 (quoting Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 
501, 515 (1986)). 
172.  Weber, 443 U.S. at 207; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
173.  See, e.g., Devins, supra note 146, at 369-70 (surveying arguments for and against this 
position); Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It’s All Over but the 
Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REV. 524, 542 (1987) (“[I]f Congress thought there would be such a 
difference between public and private employers, with the constitutional provisions 
significantly more stringent than those of Title VII, it surely would have so indicated.”). 
174.  Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat. 103, 107 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c)-(e) (2006)). The Title VII amendments 
were explicitly passed under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238 
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2154. 
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governing private actors solely on its Commerce Clause authority.175 
Furthermore, these provisions merely permit private actors to use voluntary 
preferences, a form of state action even the Warren Court at its height never 
found to trigger constitutional scrutiny.176 There is thus no basis for importing 
equal protection standards into Title VII review of private employers’ 
voluntary preferences. Indeed, doing so would violate one of the central tenets 
of the state action doctrine. As Reagan’s former Solicitor General Charles 
Fried, a strong supporter of the state action divide and the colorblind 
Constitution, has argued, “the notion that governments are bound by stricter 
rules than are private actors” renders Weber “appropriate.”177 
Even if Title VII does more than permit those preferences adopted to avoid 
disparate impact liability, there is still not sufficient state action to trigger 
constitutional concerns. Some affirmative action critics argue that Title VII not 
only permits, but also actually encourages employer preferences by providing 
disparate impact liability.178 This claim is at its strongest when an employer 
 
175.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 241, 253-55 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C § 2000e). Although many assumed initially that Title VII as applied to 
private actors codified, and thus tracked, the Constitution’s equal protection guarantees, this 
view was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976). See generally LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript at chs. 
8-10). This view of Title VII is also antithetical to the textualist, strict constructionist 
approach to statutory interpretation legal conservatives have promoted since the 1970s. See, 
e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LITIGATION (1988). 
176.  See supra Subsection III.B.1; see also American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 
52 (1999) (“Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the 
State is not state action.” (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982))). 
177.  FRIED, supra note 121, at 130; see also Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State Action 
Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1829-30 (2010) (arguing that the fact that 
“current constitutional anti-discrimination norms may not be suited for simple extension to 
private people” supports retaining the current narrow state action doctrine). On Fried’s 
strict adherence to narrow state action, see LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
6 (manuscript at ch. 13). But see Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
29 n.5, Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (No. 85-1129) 
1986 WL 728148, at *9 (“As to all employers covered by Title VII, this Court’s prior 
pronouncements on the constitutional permissibility of voluntary affirmative action 
programs by public employers are instructive with respect to Title VII’s parallel bar of 
discrimination, since similar values and interests are at stake.” (emphasis added)). 
178.  See FRIED, supra note 121, at 93-96, 119; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 
U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he inevitable focus on statistics in disparate 
impact cases could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic 
measures.”); Eang L. Ngov, When “The Evil Day” Comes, Will Title VII’s Disparate Impact 
Provision Be Narrowly Tailored to Survive an Equal Protection Clause Challenge?, 60 AM. U. L. 
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takes preferential action in order to avoid feared disparate impact liability, as 
the city in Ricci did. Yet even this strongest case should not trigger equal 
protection concerns in private employment, especially given the state action 
contractions of the Burger Court. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist led the Court in more narrowly 
construing when a state “exercised coercive power or . . . provided such 
significant encouragement . . . that the choice must in law be deemed to be that 
of the State.”179 
The Court, since articulating the “significant encouragement” test, has 
never found that the test was met,180 nor should proponents of a contracted 
state action doctrine do so in this instance. Indeed, it would vastly expand the 
ambit of state action were the Court to hold that a private decision made to 
avoid legal liability sufficed.181 Every action taken to avoid civil or criminal laws 
could potentially result in constitutional applicability. For instance, a private 
employer that prevents its employees from making racist or sexist remarks in 
the workplace in order to avoid hostile work environment claims would trigger 
free speech rights for the censured employee. If the employer bars handguns in 
 
REV. 535, 537 (2011) (noting the tension between disparate impact and disparate treatment 
liability because the former encourages employers to “make race-conscious employment 
decisions to avoid disparate impact liability”); cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 581 
(2009) (“Allowing employers to violate the disparate-treatment prohibition based on a mere 
good-faith fear of disparate-impact liability would encourage race-based action at the 
slightest hint of disparate impact.”). 
179.  Compare Blum, 457 U.S. at 1008 (finding that federal regulations generally encouraging a 
decision that was “made by private parties according to professional standards that are not 
established by the State” did not suffice), with Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) 
(finding that a state constitutional amendment repealing a fair housing law encouraged 
private discrimination sufficiently to violate equal protection). See LEE, THE WORKPLACE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript at chs. 10, 13). 
180.  See, e.g., American Mfrs. Mut. Ins., 526 U.S. at 52-53 (finding that a law permitting private 
insurers to withhold a certain type of payment did not convert such withholdings into state 
action and noting that “[w]e have never held that the mere availability of a remedy for 
wrongful conduct, even when the private use of that remedy serves important public 
interests, so significantly encourages the private activity as to make the State responsible for 
it”); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 546-47 (1987) 
(holding that where the federal government did no more than “approv[e] of or acquiesce[] 
in” the United States Olympic Committee’s enforcement of its exclusive right to use the 
word “Olympic,” there was not sufficient state action to trigger Fifth Amendment 
protections (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
181.  Such a holding regarding Title VII would be all the more sweeping because it would include 
not only actions taken to avoid criminal laws but also those taken to avoid far less coercive 
civil liability. 
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the workplace to avoid violent workplace felonies, its employees could raise 
Second Amendment challenges. Just as the current Court would never find that 
an employee could directly bring equal protection challenges against a private 
employer that adopts a preference in order to avoid disparate impact liability, 
the Court should not import equal protection standards into Title VII analysis 
of those preferences. 
*  *  * 
Even if Johnson falls to Ricci, Weber should not share its fate, nor should 
preferences that private sector employers adopt to avoid disparate impact 
liability. 
conclusion 
If and when the Supreme Court addresses Ricci’s application to private 
employment, proponents of voluntary employer preferences will have to decide 
how to limit its reach. As this history demonstrates, for over thirty years, the 
Supreme Court’s narrow view of state action has been these preferences’ 
primary protection. Proponents would be wise to insist that it remain so. I have 
marshaled this history not to map future litigation strategy, however, but to 
emphasize how quickly and persistently the reverse-state-action and 
government-by-numbers dimensions of Ackerman’s civil rights revolution 
came into conflict. With government by numbers secured under Title VII but 
increasingly constrained under equal protection, the relationship between the 
two became of paramount importance. The narrow state action doctrine 
fashioned by the Burger Court directly and indirectly insulated and preserved 
government by numbers under Title VII and in the private sector. 
What does this mean for Ackerman’s account of the civil rights revolution? 
I began by arguing that this history reveals an unexplored tension inherent in 
Ackerman’s account. If Title VII truly reworked the state action status of 
private employers and unions, then most likely either Title VII would have 
been interpreted to prohibit voluntary preferences or they would have been 
found unconstitutional. Either way, a key dimension of government by 
numbers would have been eliminated from the civil rights revolution’s 
response to employment discrimination.182 If so, the civil rights revolution, as 
Ackerman describes it, was inherently unstable. 
 
182.  The other dimensions of government by numbers in the workplace that were not insulated 
by the state action doctrine have also been threatened by equal protection. See Ricci, 557 U.S. 
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The tension could be illusory, but explaining it away raises hard and as yet 
unanswered questions for Ackerman’s overall theory of extra-Article V 
constitutional amendment. One way to explain away the tension is to contend 
that it resulted not from conflicts endemic to the civil rights revolution but 
from the Court’s failure to appropriately incorporate that revolution’s 
constitutional changes. In this account, the Court betrayed the civil rights 
revolution when it turned against government by numbers and towards 
colorblindness in the equal protection context. 
This is a plausible, even attractive, position: scholars have lodged trenchant 
critiques of the Court’s colorblind turn since it began.183 But this account raises 
questions about how consolidation is measured under Ackerman’s theory. 
According to Ackerman, the Court never fully embraced government by 
numbers under equal protection.184 Instead, it wavered, reaching back to what 
Ackerman calls the anti-humiliation principle in Brown even as it deployed a 
colorblind constitutionalism dating to World War II.185 None of the cases 
Ackerman discusses involved the workplace. The Court’s first decision 
addressing government by numbers under equal protection and in the 
employment discrimination context, Washington v. Davis, rejected it.186 
 
at 584 (avoiding deciding whether the city’s actions taken to avoid disparate impact liability 
violated equal protection by finding that they violated Title VII); Local No. 93, Int’l. Ass’n. 
of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 517 n.8 (1986) (observing that although a 
challenged consent decree did not violate Title VII, its compliance with equal protection was 
a separate, and likely harder, question); cf. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n 
v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (upholding numbers-based judicial remedies for employment 
discrimination under equal protection and Title VII, but under extremely egregious facts). 
183.  Reva Siegel, in particular, has explored its limitations, inconsistencies, and contestable 
roots. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003); Siegel, supra note 65. 
For a recent book-length critique, see RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE LAW (2013). 
184.  In Ackerman’s view, the Court went the furthest toward government by numbers under 
equal protection in the education context, but even there it pulled back. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, 
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, ch. 12. esp. 267-69, 272-76, 278-82, 287) (arguing that although 
the Court embraced numbers-based judicial remedies in the education context, it rejected 
government by numbers for identification purposes, requiring discriminatory intent for an 
equal protection violation). 
185.  Id. at 257-88. Ackerman argues that the Court’s colorblind decisions do not “deserve[] a 
central place in the civil rights canon” because they were merely a judicial effort “to fill in a 
gap left in the wake of an epochal set of decisions by We the People.” Id. at 291. They 
instead should be treated as “a supplement to, not a substitute for, the principles elaborated 
in Brown, Emporia, and the landmark statutes.” Id.; see also id. at 299, 321. 
186.  426 U.S. 229 (1976) (declining to apply disparate impact analysis under equal protection). 
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Coming in 1976, shortly after Ackerman’s account ends, Davis presses the 
question of whether government by numbers was ever consolidated as a matter 
of equal protection doctrine, at least in the workplace. An affirmative answer 
would resolve the tension I posited, but providing that answer requires 
knowing more about how consolidation occurs and when, under Ackerman’s 
theory, the window for it closes and that for judicial betrayal opens. 
Alternatively, perhaps the tension I identify is illusory because there are 
simply two constitutional tracks, one embedded in landmark statutes and the 
other in formal constitutional text. On this account, the civil rights revolution 
only ever reversed state action under Title VII, leaving intact the traditional 
doctrine as a matter of enforcing the Constitution’s equal protection 
provisions. This is the sturdiest solution, as it could also allow government by 
numbers under Title VII but not equal protection, making easy sense of Davis. 
It seems to fall far short of Ackerman’s vision for extra-Article V constitutional 
change, however. He inveighs against the legal profession for ignoring 
landmark statutes when interpreting Article V-compliant text and urges that 
they should inform each other.187 Ackerman promises to address in a future 
volume how to synthesize the civil rights revolution across time, then to 
now.188 But the fate of government by numbers in the employment 
discrimination context also calls for elaborating how synthesis should occur 
synchronically, across the statutory and textual domains of Ackerman’s 
Constitution. Only by clarifying this dynamic can we truly determine whether 
the tension I have posited is illusory or real, and whether it is attributable to 
the consolidation, synthesis, or betrayal of the civil rights revolution. 
 
187.  ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 311-42. 
188.  Id. at 328-37. 
